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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to discuss various aspects of an inmate's
available post-conviction remedies in South Carolina. Very little has been
written about this topic, perhaps because post-conviction is considered by
many to be the "redheaded stepchild of the legal system.", Despite the
importance of post-conviction remedies as a safeguard against unjust,
unconstitutional, and erroneous confinements, 2 this systemic devaluing of tie
importance of the post-conviction process is widespread. Convicted persons
in South Carolina raising post-conviction challenges rely almost exclusively on
appointed counsel, most of whom have little experience in this area of the
law.3 Counsels' enthusiasm for the cases also varies widely, but many

1. Vance L. Cowden, IndigentDefenseServicesforPost-ConvictionReliefinSouth Carolina:
CurrentProblems and PotentialRemedies, 42 S.C. L. REv. 417, 420 (1991).
2. See, e.g., Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 397 S.E.2d 87, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 972
(1990).
3. Almost all incarcerated persons are indigent and thus cannot afford to retain counsel.
Furthermore, in the majority of cases, the public defender represented the inmate at the initial
trial or plea. In those cases, the public defender's office has a conflict of interest because the
quality of the representation must be reviewed; therefore, this conflict prevents the public
defender from being involved in the post-conviction process and requires the appointment of
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appointed lawyers devote little time to investigating available grounds for relief
and in preparing the cases for trial. 4 This is especially unfortunate because,
in most cases, the state post-conviction process will be the inmate's last chance
to raise any additional challenges to his conviction or sentence.' This article
will outline the law, practice, and procedure surrounding the pursuit of postconviction remedies in South Carolina. 6 While a systematic discussion of the
tactical considerations that play a critical role in successful post-conviction
representation is beyond the scope of the article, it will address some of these
concerns. Similarly, this article will not attempt a detailed discussion of the
panoply of substantive claims that one can raise in post-conviction proceedings. 7 Rather, this article is written primarily to give to lawyers representing
inmates seeking post-conviction relief, and to provide inmates proceeding pro
se, an overview of the mechanisms of the various post-conviction remedies
available in South Carolina. The information should also prove useful to
members of the judiciary, their clerks, and others involved directly or

private practitioners. Because the state does not compensate court appointed counsel in postconviction proceedings, and very few inmates have the financial means to hire an attorney, an
established post-conviction bar does not exist in South Carolina. Thus, it is usually "amateur
hour" for the inmate, while attorneys who specialize in post-conviction work represent the state.
4. This is not meant to disparage appointed counsel, a number of whom do an excellent job.
However, in many cases, appointed counsel devote only a few hours to preparing a postconviction case, and may not even meet with the inmate until the ieek ofthe evidentiary hearing.

See Cowden, supra note 1, at 432-33.
In many instances this lack of preparation is not the appointed counsel's fault. As Professor
Cowden noted in his study, in some counties counsel is not appointed until shortly before the
hearing. Id. at 432. In other cases, appointed counsel do little investigation because they do not
know what issues are cognizable, and because of a lack of funds to conduct needed investigation.
5. The state process becomes the inmate's last chance for a variety of reasons, the most
significantbeing the "exhaustion" doctrine. To raise a claim in federal habeas corpus, a prisoner
must first have presented the substance of the claim to the state courts and must have exhausted
available state remedies. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982).
The pleading consequences of the exhaustion doctrine will be discussed later in this article.
See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text. Throughout this article, there will be discussion
of the interplay between state post-conviction remedies and federal habeas corpus. Any
systematic discussion of an inmate's federal remedies is beyond the scope of this article, but an
excellent treatise on this subject is JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACrICE AND
PROCEDURE (1988 & Supp. 1993).
6. There are three basic post-conviction remedies in South Carolina: (1) the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA), §§ 17-27-10 to -120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); (2) state
habeas corpus; and (3) motions for new trial based upon after-discovered evidence. Of these
three, the UPCPA has been the more important in recent years, although the other two remain
viable remedies. This article discusses each procedure, but emphasizes the UPCPA because it
is the most commonly utilized procedure.
7. The article mentions some of the substantive post-conviction issues. For an extensive
listing of a variety of substantive claims, see LIEBMAN, supra note 5, at 709-36. Chief Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka has maintained a summary of available post-conviction
claims in South Carolina which he will provide to appointed counsel.
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indirectly in this aspect of the judicial process.

II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
South Carolina's post-conviction relief act came into existence in 1969.8
Prior to 1969, post-conviction remedies, mostly via state habeas corpus, were
available for certain types of claims.9 This article begins with a brief
recitation of the development of the various remedies because the history is
important in delimiting the substance and procedure of modem practice.
The history of post-conviction relief divides conveniently into three
periods. The first period began in colonial times with the arrival of the writ
of habeas corpus and lasted at least until the 1930s. For these 250 years,
habeas corpus was available only on narrow jurisdictional grounds. The 1930s
marked the beginning of the expansion of the writ, so that it served as a
remedy not only for jurisdictional errors, but also for violations of constitutional rights. This period of rapid expansion continued in South Carolina until
1969, when the General Assembly passed the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act.' 0 Since then, most collateral attacks by South Carolina
prisoners in state court have employed the form of the UPCA.
A. ColonialTimes to the 1930s
The writ of habeas corpus is among the most venerable doctrines of the
English law, dating back at least to the time of the Magna Carta.II Therefore, it is no surprise that along with much of English law, the writ followed
the colonists to America despite some opposition by the Crown."2 South
Carolina stands out as an early champion of the writ by being the only colony
to have a codified habeas statute at the time of the revolution.' 3 Furthermore, South Carolina's Charles Pinckney proposed at the Constitutional

8. Act. No. 164, 1969 S.C. Acts 158.
9. A common law coram nobis remedy was also available. See, e.g., State v. Liles, 246
S.C. 59, 142 S.E.2d 433 (1965). The principal function of coram nobis was
to afford the Court an opportunity to correct its own record with reference to a vital
fact not known when the judgment was rendered and which could not have been
presented by a motion for a new trial, appeal or other existing proceeding. It lies for
an error of fact not apparent on the record, not attributable to the [defendant's] negligence, and which if known by the Court would have prevented rendition of the
judgment.
Id. at 73, 142 S.E.2d at 440.
10. Act. No. 164, 1969 S.C. Acts 158.
11. LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONvIcTIoN REMEDIES § 4, at 7 (1981 & Supp. 1993).
12. Id. at 12-13.
13. Id. at 13; see Act of Dec. 12, 1712, 2 S.C. Stat. 399 (Cooper 1837); Dallin H. Oaks,
Habeas Corpusin the States - 1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 243, 251 (1965).
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Convention that the Constitution protect habeas corpus against all infringements, and he led the state's delegation in deciding to vote against the clause
it allowed the writ to be
adopted by the Convention, on the grounds 1that
4
emergency.
or
rebellion
of
times
in
suspended
From their inception, South Carolina courts have recognized two distinct
times when a prisoner may invoke the writ of habeas corpus. The first
circumstance is before trial by a prisoner who seeks release on bail."5 The
second opportunity comes after trial by a prisoner seeking review of a
conviction16 or sentence.' 7 This article focuses on the post-conviction use
of the writ.
Although habeas corpus has a long history, one should not conclude that
nineteenth century judges liked the writ any more than contemporary judges.
To the contrary, complaints about its abuse colored the pages of the early
reporters. For instance, in State v. Potter'" the court noted that "there does
seem to be a popular misapprehension in relation to [the writ], indicating a
belief that the habeas corpus Act is a sort of universal relief law-a summary
general jail delivery."'" Additionally, in Ex parte Gilchrisf° the court
expressed its frustration with a meritless appeal in a more hysterical manner,
stating that the object of the Habeas Corpus Act was to "secure citizen from
illegal and arbitrary imprisonment; and the wildest speculations have never yet
carried it so far as to subvert all law and order. "21
In its nineteenth century form, the writ offered a remedy only in a narrow
category of cases-those in which the court that rendered judgment lacked22
jurisdiction over the defendant or the subject matter of the charge.
Therefore, habeas corpus was a remedy only when the judgment of the court
The
was "void," but not when the judgment was merely "voidable."'
coherence of this distinction depended on the court's ability to distinguish
situations in which the judgment of the court had no legal effect, from

14. Oaks, supra note 13, at 248. See generally U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (providing that
the writ of habeas corpus can be suspended in times of rebellion or invasion).
15. See Parsons v. State, 289 S.C. 542, 347 S.E.2d 504 (1986); State v. Fasket, 39 S.C.L.
(5 Rich.) 255 (1852).
16. See State v. Higgins, 51 S.C. 51, 28 S.E. 15 (1897).
17. See Exparte Nixon, 2 S.C. 4 (1870).
18. 23 S.C.L. (Dud.) 296 (1838).
19. Id. at 299.
20. 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 233 (1827).
21. Id. at 235.
22. See State v. Garlington, 56 S.C. 413, 414, 34 S.E. 689, 689 (1900) (per curiam) (citing
Exparte Bond, 9 S.C. 80, 81 (1877)).
23. Exparte Bond, 9 S.C. at 80-81; see also State v. Lundy, 19 S.C. 601 (1883) (refusing
habeas corpus because the judgment was voidable on appeal); Exparte Keeler, 45 S.C. 537,542,
23 S.E. 865, 866 (1896) (recognizing that habeas corpus is not a substitute for the right of
appeal).
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situations in which the court's judgment, although wrong, was rendered
pursuant to legitimate authority.
The task of the habeas court in this scheme consists in distinguishing those
errors that deprived the trial court of jurisdiction from those that did not.
Sometimes, the test proved easy to apply. In Gilliam v. McJunkin2 4 the
South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of the writ
when the petitioner had been convicted of contempt and imprisoned by an
order of the probate judge.' The court found that the jurisdiction of a
probate judge did not extend to this type of action.26 In other cases, the
court's resolution of the issue seems less satisfactory. For example, in Ex
parte Bond 7 the court found that the petitioner's claim that he should have
been confined in the county jail rather than in the state penitentiary was an
error remediable only by appeal.28
This scheme of distinguishing the trial court's errors seems unresponsive
to claims of constitutional violations. Nevertheless, by the beginning of the
twentieth century, the court's habeas corpus jurisprudence evolved to granting
habeas corpus to petitioners whose claims rested on an interpretation of the
Constitution. The court had not abandoned the jurisdictional analysis of
habeas; rather, it recognized that some constitutional violations deprived a trial
court of jurisdiction. Thus, in Ex parte Hollman29 the court held unconstitutional a statute that made it a crime for a sharecropper to breach a contract to
perform work on a farm.30 The Hollman court reasoned that because an
unconstitutional statute is void and not law, no court has jurisdiction to convict
31
under such a statute.
Donald Wilkes suggests that the courts limited this early recognition of
the cognizability of constitutional claims in habeas to cases in which the
petitioner complained of an unconstitutional statute because only then was the
jurisdiction of the court implicated.3 2 Thus, when the constitutional breach
in question was of a non-statutory character-such as a breach of the right to
be free from unreasonable searches-the writ would not issue because the
jurisdiction of the court was not implicated. 3

24.2 S.C. 442 (1871).
25. Id. at 450-51.
26. Id. at 450.
27. 9 S.C. 80 (1877).
28. Id. at 91-82; cf. State v. Lundy, 19 S.C. 601 (1883) (holding that because the lower court
had jurisdiction, the judgment was only voidable on appeal).
29. 79 S.C. 9, 60 S.E. 19 (1908).
30. Id. at 11-12, 25-26, 60 S.E. at 20-21, 26.
31. Id. at 11, 60 S.E. at20.
32. DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL AND STATE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF

107 (1992).
33. Id.
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As for the development of the procedures of habeas corpus, one early case
deserves mention. In Ex parte Reed 4 the court noted that the findings of fact
by a circuit judge in a habeas case are decisive, and only questions of law are
reviewable. 5 In retrospect, this rule was not as harsh as it may seem
because at that time every habeas case involved the same fundamental question
of law: Did the court have jurisdiction? Indeed, the fact that this procedural
rule was relaxed over time36 is evidence of the expansion of the substantive
grounds of habeas relief beyond the merely jurisdictional.
B. The Mid-Century Expansion of Habeas Corpus
In the 1930s, the United States Supreme Court began to expand the
availability of federal habeas corpus to state prisoners. Early in this period,
the Court abandoned the rule that a state conviction had to be void for lack of
jurisdiction for federal habeas relief to be available. 37 Among the additional
grounds for federal habeas recognized by the Court in the subsequent years
3
38
were violations of both the Due Process and Equal Protection ClausesY.
These decisions presented the states with the choice of either expanding the
availability of their own post-conviction remedies, or allowing the federal
courts to decide which state prisoners received post-conviction relief.
Predictably, most states chose to maintain control by expanding the scope of
available state collateral remedies.
South Carolina lagged behind many other states in expanding state postconviction remedies, but nevertheless did gradually enlarge the scope of
However, the first expansion in the availability of state habeas
habeas.'
corpus did not purport to protect any constitutional rights. Rather, the court
simply redefined the concept of "jurisdiction." For example, a court that
exceeded the maximum sentence allowed by law did not commit a "mere
error," but exceeded the authority of its jurisdiction.41 The court again

34. 19 S.C. 604 (1883).
35. Id. at 604-05.
36. Cf. Ross v. State, 250 S.C. 442,445-46, 158 S.E.2d 647, 648 (1967) (recognizing review
of material issues of fact by the appellate court).
37. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942). See generallyWLKES, supra note 32 at 97-102,
112-24 (discussingthe Court's abandonmentof the rule); YACKLE, supra note 11, § 5 (discussing
the expansion of the scope of federal habeas corpus).
38. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Brown
v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
39. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206
(1951).
40. WILKES, supranote 32, at 113, 115.
41. Medlockv. Spearman, 185 S.C. 296, 194 S.E. 21 (1937); ExparteKlugh, 132 S.C. 199,
128 S.E. 882 (1925). Arguably, by these rulings, the court implicitly overruled Exparte Bond
and Lundy. Later, the court reversed its reasoning though not its result, by holding that an
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redefined "jurisdiction" in Blandshaw v. State 2 in which it held that the State
43
lacks jurisdiction to try a defendant until it holds a preliminary hearing.

However, the truly important habeas corpus expansion did not evolve from
cases in which the court recognized new grounds for defeating the trial court's

jurisdiction, but instead developed from cases in which the South Carolina
Supreme Court recognized grounds unrelated to jurisdiction as warranting the

granting of the writ.
This new category of admissible habeas claims came to include an

increasing variety of constitutional rights. Among the newly protected rights

were the rights to counsel, 4" to due process, 45 and to equal protection of the
laws.46 However, other complaints of violations of constitutional rights
remained unavailable in habeas, including illegal arrest,47 cruel and unusual
punishment, 48 speedy trial, 49 and double jeopardy. 50 Despite these limitations, the court clearly became more inclined to review claims of violations of
constitutional rights in habeas proceedings. At the end of the decade, the
court implied in Sullivan v. State'1 that almost any constitutional claim could
be heard in habeas. 52
Historically, the 1960s were a period of confusion in the South Carolina
Supreme Court's habeas jurisprudence. Several cases during this era adhered
to the jurisdictional view of habeas. 53 The South Carolina Supreme Court

excessive sentence does not implicate the jurisdiction of the trial court, but rather is itself a
separate ground for habeas relief. See Bowers v. State, 241 S.C. 282, 127 S.E.2d 881 (1962).
42. 245 S.C. 385, 140 S.E.2d 784 (1965).
43. Id. at 389, 140 S.E.2d at 786; see also Tyler v. State, 247 S.C. 34, 145 S.E.2d 434
(1965) (holding that the proper inquiry in habeas when the petitioner alleges an error in the
indictment is whether the indictment is so fatally defective as to deprive the court ofjurisdiction).
44. State v. Cowart, 251 S.C. 360, 364-67, 162 S.E.2d 535, 536-38 (1968); Pitt v.
MacDougall, 245 S.C. 98, 101-06, 138 S.E.2d 840, 841-45 (1964); Grant v. MacDougall, 244
S.C. 387, 389, 137 S.E.2d 270, 271 (1964).
45. Ross v. State, 250 S.C. 442, 445, 158 S.E.2d 647, 648 (1967) (stating that denial of
effective assistance of counsel is a due process violation) (citing Crosby v. State, 241 S.C. 40,
126 S.E.2d 843 (1962)).
46. Bostick v. State, 247 S.C. 22, 26, 145 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1965) (finding petitioner's claim
that blacks were excluded from the grand and petit juries lacked merit), rev'd, 386 U.S. 479
(1967) (per curiam). But cf. Lollis v. Manning, 242 S.C. 316, 321, 130 S.E.2d 847, 850 (1963)
(holding that a claim in habeas that the Anderson County grand jury was selected in an illegal
manner refers only to an "irregularity" and thus is not cognizable in habeas).
47. See Thompson v. State, 251 S.C. 593, 596, 164 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1968).
48. See id. at 599-600, 164 S.E.2d at 763.
49. Wheeler v. State, 247 S.C. 393, 402-03, 147 S.E.2d 627, 631 (1966).
50. Grant v. MacDougall, 244 S.C. 387, 391-92, 137 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1964).
51. 251 S.C. 53, 159 S.E.2d 918 (1968).
52. See id. at 55, 159 S.E.2d at 918-19.
53. See Wheeler v. State, 247 S.C. 393, 402-03, 147 S.E.2d 627, 631 (1966); Tyler v. State,
247 S.C. 34, 39-40, 145 S.E.2d 434, 437 (1965).
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developed an unusual twist to this approach in Lollis v. Manning.4 In Lollis
the court first applied the jurisdictional analysis to resolve an alleged
irregularity in a grand jury selection process. After finding that the claim did
not implicate jurisdiction, the court applied a second test that asked whether
the petitioners were either (1) injured by the "irregularity," or (2) objected to
the irregularity before the court returned a verdict. 5 Under this test, if the
petitioners had objected, the court could have heard the claim on direct
appeal. 6 However, the court did not clarify whether the "injury" inquiry
empowered the court as an appellate court or as a habeas court. 7
A few limitations on the substance of the writ survived throughout this
period of upheaval. For example, habeas relief remained unavailable to the
petitioner who claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support a
verdict58 as well as to the petitioner who claimed actual innocence. 9 On
occasion, though, the South Carolina Supreme Court has waived, ex gratia,
this rule and in habeas proceedings has considered whether the evidence was
sufficient to support the verdict.' Furthermore, because the writ continued
to be regarded as allowing an inquiry into the validity of the defendant's
detention, the defendant could not raise claims that did not end or reduce the
incarceration period. Thus, the law required a petitioner serving concurrent

54. 242 S.C. 316, 130 S.E.2d 847 (1963).
55. Id. at 321, 130 S.E.2d at 850.
56. Id. at 319-21, 130 S.E.2d at 849-50.
57. See id. at 321, 130 S.E.2d at 850.
58. Sullivanv. State, 251 S.C. 53, 159 S.E.2d 918 (1968); Wyatt v. State, 243 S.C. 197, 133
S.E.2d 120 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 925 (1964); Medlock v. Spearman, 185 S.C. 296, 194
S.E. 21 (1937).
59. Dickson v. State, 247 S.C. 153, 146 S.E.2d 257 (1966); Hayes v. State, 242 S.C. 328,
130 S.E.2d 906 (1963); Exparte Herrera, 860, S.W.2d 106 (rex. Crim. App.) (per curiam), stay
denied sub nom. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 2325 (1993) (mem.).
60. McCrary v. State, 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1013 (1967).
Furthermore, procedural aspects of the remedy developed in case law during this period. In
many respects, the procedural modifications tracked federal habeas corpus procedure. The basic
rule of pleading required the petitioner to make at least a prima facie showing entitling him to
relief by stating sufficient facts to allow an intelligent preliminary judgment on the merits.
Dickson v. State, 247 S.C. 153, 146 S.E.2d 257 (1966); Wyatt v. State, 243 S.C. 197, 133
S.E.2d 120 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 925 (1964); Blandshaw v. State, 245 S.C. 385, 140
S.E.2d 784 (1965); cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80 (1977) ("This is not to say that
every set of allegations not on its face without merit entitles a habeas corpus petitioner to an
evidentiary hearing."). Having done so, petitioner is entitled to a hearing. Johnson v. State, 246
S.C. 483, 144 S.E.2d 285 (1965); Tillman v. Manning, 241 S.C. 221, 127 S.E.2d 721 (1962).
At the hearing, the petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the petition warrants relief. Thompson v. State, 251 S.C. 593, 164 S.E.2d 760 (1968); Bailey
v. MacDougall, 251 S.C. 290, 162 S.E.2d 177 (1968). On appeal from a decision of the hearing
judge, the supreme court is limited to determining whether there is evidence to sustain the
findings. Ross v. State, 250 S.C. 442, 158 S.E.2d 647 (1967).
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sentences to challenge the validity of both sentences in habeas because the
granting of the writ for one sentence alone would not entitle him to release or
to a new trial. s
C. 1969 to the Present
As noted above, in response to the danger of unredressed constitutional
violations, the United States Supreme Court dramatically increased the number
of cases in which it granted federal habeas relief to state prisoners asserting
federal deprivations of federal constitutional rights.62 Therefore, to maintain
control of the post-conviction process, the states had to expand their remedies
63
to comply with the Court's interpretation of constitutional requirements.
This was especially true in light of the Supreme Court's implication in Young
v. Ragen that the Constitution requires state post-conviction remedies that
adequately protect federal rights.'
In Case v. Nebraska the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide exactly that question,67 but before the case
was heard, the Nebraska legislature passed a post-conviction relief statute that
satisfied the Court,68 and so the Court remanded the case without resolving
the question.69 South Carolina responded to this pressure in 1969 by
enacting the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.7" The South Carolina
Act is virtually identical to the Revised Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act promulgated by the National Conference on Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.7 1 Unfortunately, there is no legislative history accompanying the
General Assembly's passage of the new Act. However, the Uniform Act's
history states that it was designed to meet "the minimum standards of justice;
and to reduce the use of federal habeas corpus .... ,2
Against this historical backdrop, each of the available remedies is
discussed.

61. McCall v. State, 247 S.C. 15, 145 S.E.2d 419 (1965).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
63. For a more detailed discussion of this history, see WILKES, supra note 32, at 543-45.
64. 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
65. WILKES, supra note 32, at 543.
66. 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
67. Id. at 337.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Act No. 164, 1969 S.C. Acts 158.
71. UNiF. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, 11 U.L.A. 477 (1974 & Supp. 1993).
72. Id. at 481 (Commissioners' Prefatory Note); see also Cowden,. supra note 1, at 422
(comparing the South Carolina Act with the model act).
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III. OVERVIEW OF SOUTH CAROLINA POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE

A. The Purpose of the Post-ConvictionRelief Act
The broad purpose of the South Carolina post-conviction process 73 is to
provide convicted persons with a comprehensive mechanism to bring to the
state court's attention any unresolved and previously not mentioned questions
of fact and law relevant to their convictions or sentences.74 The Act was
intended to be exclusive, taking "the place of all other common law, statutory
or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of a
conviction or sentence. "75 However, it has not quite worked out as intended.
B. Who May Bring an Action and When
The right to apply for post-conviction relief is extended to any person who
has been convicted or sentenced for the commission of a crime.76 Further,
a person seeking relief need not be in custody when he brings an action.'
As long as the applicant alleges that "the results of his prior conviction still
persist," even if the sentence has been fully served, the applicant may be
entitled to relief.78
While there is no statute of limitations, under some circumstances, the
state may raise the equitable defense of laches. 79 To do so, however, the
state must be able to make some showing of prejudice arising from the late
filing.80 Also, a person cannot maintain an action while "an appeal from the
conviction or. sentence is pending or during the time in which an appeal may
be perfected.""'

73. The PCR Act and its various requirements are codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-10
to -120 (Law. Co-op. 1985), S.C. App. CT. R. 227, and in S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1 (formerly
Supreme Court Rules 50(1)-(8)).
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985); see also YACKLE, supra note 11,
at 3 (discussing the functions served by state habeas remedies).
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
76. Id. § 17-27-20(a).
77. McDuffie v. State, 276 S.C. 229, 277 S.E.2d 595 (1981).
78. Id. at 231, 277 S.E.2d at 596. For example, McDuffie alleged that his South Carolina
conviction was used to enhance the punishment for a subsequent North Carolina charge. Id. at
230, 277 S.E.2d at 595.
79. McElrath v. State, 276 S.C. 282, 277 S.E.2d 890 (1981).
80. Brazell v. State, 278 S.C. 253, 294 S.E.2d 343 (1982) (per curiam). For example, the
state must be able to demonstrate the unavailability of material witnesses or that other critical
evidence has been lost or destroyed as a result of the delay. See id. at 254, 294 S.E.2d at 343.
81. S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(b).
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C. The Relationship Between PCR and Direct Appeal
The language of the statute specifically states that post-conviction relief
is "not a substitute for. . . direct review of the sentence or conviction.""2
This clause has several important implications. First, it prevents an applicant
from filing for post-conviction relief while a direct appeal is pending, or prior
to the expiration of time for the filing of a direct appeal."8 Second, in some
cases, the clause will prevent the applicant from raising in the post-conviction
proceeding any claim of trial error that could have been raised on direct
appeal.84 Additionally, an applicant may not reassert in a post-conviction
proceeding any issues that were raised previously on direct appeal. 85 The
doctrine that "[e]rrors in a petitioner's trial which could have been reviewed
on appeal may not be asserted for the first time, or reasserted, in postconviction proceedings" 6 -sometimes referred to as the Simmons

rule8a--has been reaffirmed in a host of noncapital cases.88 Until recently,

however, the South Carolina courts had never applied the rule in a capital
case, because of the doctrine of in favorem vitae.8 9 Thus, in several
decisions the supreme court addressed legal issues in post-conviction raised for

82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
83. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(b).
84. See Griffin v. Warden, 277 S.C. 288,286 S.E.2d 145, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 942 (1982);

Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 417, 215 S.E.2d 883 (1975); Johnson v. State, 261 S.C. 350, 200
S.E.2d 81 (1973) (per curiam).
85. Simmons, 264 S.C. at 423, 215 S.E.2d at 885.
86. Id. (quoting State v. White, 162 S.E.2d 473, 480 (N.C. 1968)).
87. See Drayton v. Evatt, _ S.C.
,
, 430 S.E.2d 517, 520, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
607 (1993).
88. See, e.g., Hyman v. State, 278 S.C. 501, 299 S.E.2d 330 (1983); Peeler v. State, 277
S.C. 70, 283 S.E.2d 826 (1981). However, jurisdictional defects in the proceedings may be
raised at any time. See Williams v. State, 306 S.C. 89, 410 S.E.2d 563 (1991).
89. Pursuant to infavorem vitae, the South Carolina Supreme Court was obligated "to review
the entire record for legal error, and assume error when unobjected-to but technically improper
arguments, evidence, jury charges, etc. are asserted by the defendant on appeal in a demand for
reversal or a new trial." State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 60-61, 406 S.E.2d 315, 324 (1991)
('foal, J., concurring); see also Drayton, 430 S.E.2d at 519 (discussing infavorem vitae review).
It meant that issues could be raised on direct appeal in a capital case regardless of whether there
had been a proper objection at trial, or some other procedural obstacle to merit review of the
claims. See, e.g., State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 543, 546, 290 S.E.2d 420, 421 (1982), overruledby
Torrence. Furthermore, on several occasions, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed capital
cases on the basis of issues not raised by the parties. See, e.g., State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. 690,
695 258 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1979), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982), overruledby Torrence. The
infavorem vitae doctrine, which had been firmly entrenched in capital punishmentjurisprudence
of the South Carolina Supreme Court for almost two hundred years, was abolished in Torrence.
See State v. Briggs, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 7 (1794). Thus, capital cases that proceeded to trial after
Torrence are governed by essentially the same procedural rules that are applicable to noncapital
cases.
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the first time in state collateral proceedings.'
However, in Drayton v.
9
Evatt' the court held that in capital cases reviewed pursuant to in favorem
vitae, legal claims apparent from the face of the record are barred from
collateral review.' The second aspect of Simmons bars such issues in that
they cannot be reasserted in post-conviction proceedings.'
The court
reasoned that "[u]nder in favorem vitae review, all direct appeal errors are
assumed to have been reviewed by this Court, and thus are barred from
collateral attack. "I9
The main consequence of the Simmons rule is that issues that could have
been raised on direct appeal, but were not, also require a claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel.' Furthermore, an issue which was not raised
on direct appeal because it had not been properly preserved at trial (trial
counsel did not lodge a contemporaneous or adequate objection), or an issue
which was raised on direct appeal but not considered by the appellate court for
the same reason (inadequate preservation of the record at trial), must be
accompanied by an allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 96
Both the substantive claim and the ineffective assistance of counsel claims
should be included in the application for post-conviction relief.'

90. See, e.g., Yates v. Aiken, 290 S.C. 231, 234, 349 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1986), rev'd, 484 U.S.
211 (1988); Thompson v. Aiken, 281 S.C. 239, 315 S.E.2d 110 (1984).
91. __ S.C. _, 430 S.E.2d 517 (1993).
92. Id. at _, 430 S.E.2d at 520 (citing Hyman v. State, 278 S.C. 501, 299 S.E.2d 330
(1983)).
93. Drayton, - S.C. at _, 430 S.E.2d at 520.

94. Id. at _, 430 S.E.2d at 519. However, the court left open the possibility that, in some
circumstances, a death sentenced inmate may raise record-based issues in a petition for writ of
habeas corpus. Id. at _,

430 S.E.2d at 520 n.2 (citing Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 397

S.E.2d 87, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 972 (1990)). Furthermore, this rule only applies if the court
reviewed the case on direct appeal in favorem vitae. If a trial commenced after the South

Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Torrence, then counsel cannot assume that the Supreme
Court reviewed all record-based issues. State v. Rocheville,_ S.C.
, 425 S.E.2d 32, 34-35,
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2978 (1993). Issues not raised in these cases should be included in the
application for post-conviction relief accompanied by an allegation of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. Drayton, __ S.C. at_, 430 S.E.2d at 520 (citing Hyman v. State, 278 S.C.
501, 299 S.E.2d 330 (1983)).
95. Drayton, _ S.C. at _, 430 S.E.2d at 520 (citing Hyman v. State, 278 S.C. 501, 299
S.E.2d 330 (1983)); see also Bozeman v. State, 307 S.C. 172, 414 S.E.2d 144 (1992) (hearing
direct appeal issue because of trial counsel's ineffectiveness); Hyman v. State, 278 S.C. 501, 299
S.E.2d 330 (1983) (per curiam) (affirming the denial of relief when the post-conviction relief
judge held that counsel was not ineffective).
96. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, _ S.C. _, 419 S.E.2d 225 (1992) (finding ineffective
assistance of counsel and granting post-connection relief); Sosebee v. Leeke, 293 S.C. 531, 362
S.E.2d 22 (1987); (granting post-conviction relief because of trial error which court did not
review on direct appeal due to a lack of contemporaneous objection).
97. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Another consequence of the Court's
view that the class of claims able to be raised on appeal and the class of claims able to be raised
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D. Cognizable Claims
Under the South Carolina Post-Conviction Procedure Act, almost any
alleged denial of a federal constitutional rights is cognizable in a postconviction proceeding. 9 The only federal claim not available is sufficiency
of the evidence. 9 Furthermore, the Act recognizes almost any abridgment
of a state created right."'0 Specifically, the statute renders the following
categories of claims cognizable: (1) the conviction or sentence was in violation
of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this
State;101 (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;"'0 (3)
the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;'0 3 (4) there exists
evidence of material facts not previously presented and heard thereby requiring
vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;1 °4 (5) his
in post-conviction proceedings are mutually exclusive is that one may not raise on direct appeal
any claim that can be raised only in post-convictionproceedings. See, e.g., State v. Kornahrens,
290 S.C. 281, 350 S.E.2d 180 (1986) (holding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can
only be raised in post-conviction proceedings), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987); State v.
McKinney, 278 S.C. 107, 292 S.E.2d 598 (1982) (finding involuntariness of a guilty plea can
only be attacked in post-conviction proceedings).
98. Finklea v. State, 273 S.C. 157, 158, 255 S.E.2d 447, 447-48 (1979) ("Our PostConviction Procedure Act is designed to incorporate all rights available under federal habeas
corpus." (citing Harvey v. South Carolina, 310 F. Supp. 83 (D.S.C. 1970))).
99. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a)(6) (Law. Co-op. 1985) ("[Tlhis section shall not be
construed to permit collateral attack on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support
a conviction."). But cf. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-16 (1979) (holding that
insufficiency of evidence is a federal constitutional claim).
100. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
101. Id.; see also Singleton v. State, _ S.C. _, 437 S.E.2d 53, 58, 61 (1993) (holding that
petitioner was not presently competent and thus his execution would violate the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and further that Article I, Section 10 of the South
Carolina Constitution prevents the state from forcibly medicating applicant with psychotropic
drugs in an effort to restore his competency); Murdock v. State, _

S.C.

_,

_,

426 S.E.2d

740, 741-42 (1992) (finding that petitioner was denied her right to the effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
102. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1985); see also Slack v. State, _ S.C.
. ...

429 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1993) (finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept

petitioner's plea to grand larceny because he had neither been indicted for that offense nor waived
presentment of the charge).
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1985); see also Fewell v. State, 267
S.C. 17, 20-22, 225 S.E.2d 853, 854-55 (1976) (finding that a ten year sentence for a first
offense of possession of LSD with intent to distribute was excessive when the petitioner was
charged only with simple possession of LSD, which is limited by statute to two years for the first
offense); Clark v. State, 259 S.C. 378, 382-83, 192 S.E.2d 209, 210 (1972) (per curiam)
(holding that an inmate can not seek a "time cut" in a sentence if the sentence was within the
statutorily defined limits). The lack ofjurisdiction to reduce otherwise proper sentences seems
not to be widely recognized by many inmates who file pro se applications seeking a reduction in
their sentences.
104. S.C. CODE ANN.,§ 17-27-20(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1985). This is similar to the relevant
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/3
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sentence has expired, his probation, parole, or conditional release unlawfully
revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody. .. ; and (6) the
conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground
of alleged error [previously] available under any common law, statutory or

other motion, writ, petition, proceeding or remedy ....

11

In sum, an application for post-conviction relief may include virtually any
allegation relevant to any phase of the previous court proceedings.l°7
E. Various Pleading and ProceduralIssues
1. Post-Convictionis a Civil Proceeding
It is important to note that post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding. An

standard the court uses in evaluating motions for new trial based on after-discovered evidence.
See infra notes 205-15 and accompanying text. The supreme court has not explored the
relationship between this particular aspect of post-conviction relief and a motion for new trial,
but it appears that both remain viable means of bringing new evidence before the state courts.
Compare State v. South, _ S.C. _, __, 427 S.E.2d 666, 668-69 (1993) (considering afterdiscovered evidence as part of a motion for new trial) with Clark v. State, __ S.C. __,
,
434 S.E.2d 266, 267-68 (1993) (considering after-discovered evidence as part of an application
for post-conviction relief).
105. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1985); see also Griffin v. State, __
S.C. _, _, 433 S.E.2d 862, 863-64 (1993) (finding that applicant's decision to plead guilty
to voluntary manslaughter was based on his ability to petition for parole annually, therefore, a
law changing the standard to biannual parole review violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
U.S. Constitution), cert. denied, No. 93-858, 1993 WL 501895 (Jan. 24, 1994).
106. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a)(6) (Law. Co-op. 1985). However, conditions of
confinement are not cognizable in post-conviction. See Tutt v. State, 277 S.C. 525, 526, 290
S.E.2d 414, 415 (1982) (per curiam). But see Crowe v. Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 763-64, 259
S.E.2d 614, 615 (1979) (holding that conditions of confinement are properly raised as part of a
state habeas corpus claim).
107. Most modem post-convictioncases focus on general or particular allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Chalk v. State, _ S.C. _, 437 S.E.2d 19 (1993) (per
curiam); Murdock v. State, __ S.C. _,
426 S.E.2d 740 (1992); Simmons v. State,
-S.C.
, 419 S.E.2d 225 (1992); Riddle v. State, _ S.C. __, 418 S.E.2d 308 (1992);
Thomas v. State, 308 S.C. 123, 417 S.E.2d 531 (1992).
In my opinion, however, counsel usually gives inadequate attention to other available
constitutional claims. E.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (holding prosecution
may not solicit false or perjured testimony or allow it to go uncorrected); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (holding state can not elicit statement from jailed defendant through
surreptitious use of another inmate after the defendant's right to counsel has attached); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (finding due process requires state to disclose to defendant
exculpatory material); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (holding
conviction violates due process if defendant was not competent to stand trial); Remmer v. United
States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (holding juror's communications with third party rendered defendant
entitled to a hearing to determine effect of communications on juror), reh'g granted,348 U.S.
904 (1955).
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application for post-conviction relief constitutes an independent civil
action, 10 8 and, therefore, the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure apply
to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the UPCA.0 9 The statute
specifically0 incorporates the applicable civil practice rules into post-conviction
11
practice.
Thus, the petitioner commences the process by filing a complaint or more

specifically, an application for post-conviction relief in the circuit in which the
defendant was convicted."'

The UPCA and the Rules of Civil Procedure

set out specific requirements for information that must be included in the
application."' If the applicant is unable to pay for court costs and representation fees, the applicant may file and proceed in forma pauperis."3
2. Pleading Groundsfor Relief
The UPCA requires that the application allege particular grounds for
relief-the specific defects in the trial or criminal proceeding that warrant a
reversal or recision-including the legal basis for the claims and supporting
facts. The application must also clearly state the relief desired." 4 The
petitioner may include affidavits, court records, or other material relevant as
evidence with the application."'
In raising issues in state post-conviction, counsel should keep the federal
habeas corpus exhaustion doctrine in mind. Before a claim may be presented
in federal court, it must have first been presented to the state court; therefore,
available state remedies must be exhausted. The purpose of the exhaustion
requirement is "to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal

108. S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(c).
, _,
420 S.E.2d 834, 842
109. S.C. R. Civ. P. 1, 71.1(a); Arnold v. State, _ S.C.
(1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1302 (1993).
110. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (Law. Co-op. 1985); see Gamble v. State, 298 S.C. 176,
379 S.E.2d 119 (1989).
111. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-40 (Law. Co-op. 1985). If the conviction is an adult offense,
the application is filed in the Court of Common Pleas. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-30 (Law.
Co-op. 1985). If the offense is juvenile in nature, it is filed in the Family Court. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-450 (Law. Co-op. 1985). Furthermore, if the court granted a change of venue, the
petitioner should file the application in the county to which the venue was changed, not the
county in which the offense allegedly took place and the defendant originally was charged.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. §§. 17-27-40 to -50 (Law. Co-op. 1985). A copy of the application is
included as Form 5 of the Appendix of Forms created pursuant to S.C. R. Civ. P. 84.
113. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-60 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
114. Id. § 17-27-50.
115. Id. Additionally, the applicationmust include a verification signed by the applicantwhich
affirms that the facts alleged in the application are within the personal knowledge of the applicant
and affirms the authenticity of all documents and exhibits contained in the application. Id.
§ 17-27-40.
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law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings."" 6 A claim is
generally considered exhausted when the claim has been "fairly presented" one
time to the highest state court.117 For example, if the defendant raises the
claim on direct appeal, it does not have to be raised again in the state postconviction proceedings."' Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court
has held that the exhaustion requirement is satisfied even if the state tribunal
does not fully consider the claim, as long as it had a fair opportunity to do so,
and as such, the state courts were reasonably informed of the nature of the
claim; generally, this means that state courts must be given the relevant facts
and law and must be apprised that the claim rests, in whole or in part, on the
federal constitution. 1 9 Therefore, for pleading purposes, counsel should
insure that all grounds for post-conviction relief fairly inform the court of
these relevant facts and the claim's federal constitutional basis.120

116. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982) (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court,

410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973)).
117. Id. at 523 (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)).
118. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per curian).
119. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982) (per curiam); see also Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971) (discussing the requirements of the exhaustion doctrine); Wise v.
Warden, 839 F.2d 1030, 1033 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying the exhaustion doctrine).
120. For example, suppose counsel's investigation revealed that a "jailhouse snitch," who
testified against the applicant at trial, was encouraged by law enforcement to elicit information
from the applicant. The ground for relief set forth below would satisfy the exhaustion
requirement (Numbers refer to items 9 and 10 found in Form 5 of the Appendix of Forms
promulgated pursuant to S.C. R. Civ. P. 84).
9(x) The State violated applicant'srights guaranteedby the Sixth, Eighth, and
FourteenthAmendments of the United States Constitutionand by South Carolinalaw
when it failed to reveal that one of its witnesses was acting as a state agent when he
allegedly obtained incriminatinginformationfrom applicant.
10(x) John Doe testified for the State at applicant's trial, maintaining that
applicant, while both men were incarcerated, provided him with certain information
regarding the crime. Not only was John Doe's testimony false, but also the State
failed to reveal that Doe was acting as a state agent at the time he allegedly discussed
the case with applicant. Furthermore, the incriminating statements were obtained
after applicant's right to counsel had attached. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S.
264 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
Similarly, the following claim would exhaust an allegation of ineffective assistance of
counsel:
9(y) Applicantwas deniedthe effective assistanceofcounsel, in violationof South
Carolinalaw, and the Sixth and FourteenthAmendments to the United States Constitution, as a result of trial counsel'sfailure to requestan instructionthat any doubt
as to whether applicantwas guilty of murder or manslaughtermust be resolved in
applicant'sfavor.
10(y) Applicant was convicted of murder. The jury was also instructed regarding
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3. The State's Response
After the petitioner files the application, the code requires the clerk of
court to forward a copy to the solicitor's office and the attorney general's

office."' The State-as respondent-is required to answer the allegations
within thirty (30) days, or -within such further time as the court may
allow." However, if the respondent fails to file an answer in the specified
period, the applicant must conclusively show that he has been prejudiced by
the respondent's delay in order to receive the relief requested in the application. 123
4. PrehearingProcedure
a. Appointment of Counsel
If the application contains issues that will necessitate a hearing to resolve,
and the applicant is indigent, the court is obligated to promptly appoint
counsel. The rules specifically mandate that counsel must be permitted a
reasonable time to confer with the applicant, to evaluate the application, and
to insure that all available grounds for relief are included in the application. 124
b. Amending the Application
Counsel may-and should-amend the application to include additional
grounds for relief.'25 In practice, the rules allow amendments until the time
the court conducts the evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, pursuant to S.C. R.

the lesser included offense of manslaughter. However, the trial judge failed to
instruct the jury that any doubt as to whether applicant was guilty of the greater or
lesser offense must be resolved in his favor. Despite the fact that this instruction was
clearly warranted and required by South Carolina law, counsel neither requested the
instruction nor objected to the trial judge's failure to properly charge the jury. See
State v. Davis, _ S.C. _, 422 S.E.2d 133, 145 (1992) (citing State v. King, 158
S.C. 251, 155 S.E. 409 (1930)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2355 (1993). Counsel's
omission was both unreasonable and prejudicial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984); Chalk v. State, _ S.C. _, 437 S.E.2d 19 (1993) (per curiam).
121. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-40 (Law Co-op. 1985).
122. Id. § 17-27-70(a); see also Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 195 S.E.2d 392 (1973)
(discussing the discretionary nature of the thirty day limit).
123. Kneece v. State, 269 S.C. 177, 236 S.E.2d 746 (1977) (per curiam) (citing Herring v.
State, 262 S.C. 597, 206 S.E.2d 885 (1974)).
124. See S.C.R. Civ. p. 71.1(d). For a discussion of the various problems associated with
the appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings see Cowden, supra note 1, at 428-34.
125. S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(d).
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Civ. P. 15(b), the petitioner may amend the application during or after the
hearing to conform the pleadings to the evidence presented. 126
c. Discovery
The rules of discovery applicable in other civil cases also apply in postconviction proceedings.127 The rules allow use of interrogatories, requests
to produce documents, depositions, requests for admission, and other
1
discovery mechanisms. 8
d. Fundsfor Investigative and Expert Services
Limited funds are available for investigative and expert services.
Pursuant to the 1994 Appropriations Act, 29 counsel in post-conviction
proceedings are allotted five hundred dollars for investigative and expert
services."O However, the statute clearly contemplates that the court may
award additional funds upon a showing of reasonable necessity.'
e. Determining Whether a Hearing is Required
The UPCA requires the court to evaluate the application and the return
before it can make any ultimate dispensation of the proceedings. Once it has
had the opportunity to fully review the pleadings, the court may indicate its
intent to dismiss the application.' 2 However, if the application sets forth
grounds for relief that present issues of fact that are not conclusively refuted
by the record, a hearing must be held.'
If the court decides there is
absolutely no basis for the relief sought, it will notify the parties of the reasons

126. See Arnold v. State, 420 S.E.2d 834, 842 (citing Baxley v. Rosenblum, 303 S.C. 340,
400 S.E.2d 502 (Ct. App 1991)). However, the court also held in Arnold that completely new
issues could not be added to the application pursuant to S.C. R. Civ. P 59(e) after a final order
was entered denying post-conviction relief. Id.
127. See Gamble v. State, 298 S.C. 176, 379 S.E.2d 118 (1989).
128. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(a).
129. Act. No. 164, 1993 S.C. Acts 531.
130. Id. at 1221 (codified at S.C. Code Ann. § 17-3-50(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993)).
131. Id. (codified at S.C. Code Ann. § 17-3-50(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
132. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-70(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
133. Chambers v. State, 262 S.C. 202, 206, 203 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1974). As a general rule,
a sufficiently pleaded allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel will insure that a hearing is
conducted. See Rogers v. State, 261 S.C. 288, 291, 199 S.E.2d 761, 762 (1973) (holding that
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a primafacieviolation of constitutional rights
thereby requiring an evidentiary hearing to resolve a question of fact). Conversely, a hearing is
not required if the application only raises questions of law. Ballew v. State, 262 S.C. 393, 396,
204 S.E.2d 736, 737 (1974).
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supporting its decision and dismiss the case in a conditional order of
dismissal."' The Act provides the applicant the opportunity to submit a
response to any such order. 3 In practice, evidentiary hearings are generally held in cases involving an inmate's first application for post-conviction
relief.
5. Evidentiary Hearings
Evidentiary hearings are generally held during post-conviction terms of
court scheduled by the Office of Court Administration. Most judicial circuits
have two or more post-conviction terms a year. 36 However, it is not
uncommon for post-conviction hearings in capital cases to be heard at special
terms of court requested by the Attorney General or scheduled with the
137
consent of both parties.
At the hearing, the applicant, as the moving party, presents his evidence
first and has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he
is entitled to the relief sought in the application.138 Evidence and testimony
may be presented through affidavits, 39 depositions, and oral testimony. 40
As a strategic matter, counsel must remember that the judge presiding over the
evidentiary hearing knows little or nothing about the case in most circumstances. Thus, for example, a trial brief summarizing the evidence presented at the
applicant's trial and introducing the court to the issues presented in the
application for post-conviction relief may prove invaluable to the court's
understanding of the relevant facts and law. Similarly, if evidentiary issues
will likely arise at the hearing, counsel should prepare a memorandum for the
court addressing those issues. In sum, the hearing should be viewed in the
same manner as counsel would view any civil non-jury trial.

134. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-70(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
135. Id.
136. Court Administration issues a list of the terms of court approximately once every six

months.
137. In South Carolina, the judge who presided over the applicant's guilty plea, trial, or
probation revocation proceeding may not preside at the post-conviction relief hearing. Floyd v.

State, 303 S.C. 298, 299, 400 S.E.2d 145, 146 (1991) (per curiam).
138. S.C. R. CIv. P. 71.1(e); see Cobbs v. State, 305 S.C. 299, 301, 408 S.E.2d 223, 225
(1991) (citing Griffin v. Martin, 278 S.C. 620, 300 S.E.2d 482 (1983)); Butler v. State, 286 S.C.
441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985) (citing Griffin v. Martin, 278 S.C. 620, 300 S.E.2d 482
(1983)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1094 (1986).
139. See Beckettv. State, 278 S.C. 223,294 S.E.2d 46 (1982) (per curiam); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 17-27-80 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
140. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
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6. PosthearingProcedure
a. PosthearingBriefs
In complicated fact-intensive cases involving the testimony of several
witnesses, those containing a number of issues, or other appropriate cases,
counsel should seek leave to file a post-hearing brief. In many instances,
counsel may want to review the transcript of the evidentiary hearing before
preparing the brief. In capital post-conviction cases, for example, counsel for
both applicant and the respondent file post-hearing briefs due to the inevitably
complex nature of the relief grounds. In general, the courts will allow counsel
for the applicant to file a brief thirty to forty-five days after the court has
provided the evidentiary hearing transcript to counsel. 1 41 The Attorney
General is given a similar amount of time to file it's post-hearing brief."
b. Orders
The UPCA states that the "court shall make specific findings of fact, and
state expressly its conclusions of law" in reaching its decision on the
application. '41 The post-conviction relief judge is permitted to issue any
orders necessary with respect to the applicant's conviction or sentence. If the
court finds in favor of the applicant, it has the power to enter an "appropriate
order,"' 44 which has been interpreted by the South Carolina Supreme Court
as granting the lower court the authority to "fashion an appropriate reme46
dy."" The appropriate order is a final judgement.1
In most cases, the court will ask the prevailing party to prepare an order.
However, counsel should be aware that the court is not supposed to contact
counsel ex parte, and the losing party must be given an adequate opporiunity
to respond to any proposed order submitted by opposing counsel. 47
Furthermore, the order should adequately address the merits of every issue in

141. This rule is based solely on the practice as it has evolved. [AUTHOR].

142. Id.
143. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
144. Id.
145. Singleton v. State, __ S.C. _, 437 S.E.2d 53 (1993). For example, the court stated
that under some circumstances, the post-convictionjudge could vacate the applicant's conviction
and sentence. In the court's view, this would be a "clear cut remedy" if the post-convictioncourt
determined, based on evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, that the applicant had been
wrongfully convicted. Id. at _,

437 S.E.2d at 59.

146. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
147. S.C. APP. CT. R. 501, CANON 3(A)(4); see Stakes v. Hawkins, 288 S.C. 485, 343
S.E.2d 623 (S.C. 1986); Herring v. Retail Credit Co., 266 S.C. 455, 461, 224 S.E.2d 663, 666
(1976).
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the application. In Pruitt v. State,14 8 the South Carolina Supreme Court expressed "concern with the increasing number of orders in PCR proceedings
that fail to address the merits of the issues raised by the applicant."1" 9 The
court noted that not only did this deprive the parties of a ruling on the issues
raised, but it also made appellate review more laborious. 150 In fact, in
Pruitt, the court determined that the failure to address the issues in the order
The court stated:
required that a new hearing be conducted.'
Counsel preparing orders should be meticulous in doing so, opposing
counsel should call any omissions to the attention of the PCR judge prior
to issuance of the order, and the PCR judge should carefully review the
order before signing it. Even after an order is filed, counsel has an
obligation to review the order and file a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to
alter or amend if the order fails to set forth the findings and the reasons
for those findings as required by § 17-27-80 and Rule 52(a), SCRCP. 152
c. Motions to Alter or Amend the Judgement
A motion to alter or amend the judgment, brought pursuant to South
Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), may be appropriate in some cases.
The primary purpose of a rule 59(e) motion is to permit the trial judge ' to
"reconsider matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits."' 5
Thus, the motion may be utilized when the order contains erroneous findings
of fact or a clear misapplication of established legal principles. A Rule 59(e)
motion would also seem to be appropriate if there has been intervening
authority relevant to an issue in the case. Furthermore, as noted above, the
South Carolina Supreme Court recently held that counsel must file a rule 59(e)
motion if the order does not set forth the findings and the reason for the
findings relevant to each and every ground for relief contained in the

application. 154
A Rule 59(e) motion must be served within ten days of receiving written
notice of the entry of the order denying post-conviction relief. '5 Furthermore, it tolls the time for filing a notice of intent to appeal. 156

148. __ S.C. _, 423 S.E.2d 127 (1992) (per curiam).
423 S.E.2d at 128.
149. Id. at_,
, 423 S.E.2d at 128.
150. Id. at
, 423 S.E.2d at 128.
151. Id. at
152. Id.at __,423 S.E.2d at 128.
153. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 200 (1988) (quoting White v.
New Hampshire Dep't of Employment See., 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982)).
154. Pruit, _ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 128.
155. S.C. R. Civ. P. 59(b).
156. S.C. R. Civ. P. 59(f).
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1. Perfecting the Appeal
The UPCA and South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 227 provide for an
appeal by either the applicant or the state.1 17 In some cases, cross-appeals

are fied, for example, if the judge grants post-conviction relief in regard to
a death sentenced inmate's sentence, but concludes that the inmate is not
entitled to a new guilt-or-innocence trial. Thus, to effectuate an appeal from
the denial of post-conviction relief, counsel must serve a notice of appeal on
the respondent within thirty (30) days after receipt of written notice of entry
of the order denying relief. 5 8 If a timely motion to alter or amend the
judgment was filed, then the notice of appeal must be filed thirty days after

written notice of entry of the order denying the motion.'"9 Furthermore, if
a cross-appeal is planned, respondent must serve "a notice of appeal on all
adverse parties within five (5) days after receipt of appellant's notice of
appeal, or within the time prescribed by Rule 203(b), whichever period last
expires. " " The notice of appeal must be filed with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court and the clerk of the lower court-the county in which the

application
was filed-within ten days after it is served on opposing coun61
sel.1
The transcript of the hearing must be ordered within ten days of service
of the notice of appeal. 'I Then, thirty days after receipt of the transcript,
the petitioner-the appellant-must serve and file the appendix and petition for
writ of certiorari. 63 The respondent is given thirty (30) days to file and
157. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-100 (Law. Co-op. 1985). ("[A] final judgment entered under
this chapter may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of this State on appeal brought either by the
applicant or the State in accordance with laws governing appeals from the circuit court in civil
cases.").
158. S.C. APP. CT. R. 227(b); see S.C. App. Cr. R. 203(b)(1). The contents of the notice
of appeal are set forth in S.C. APP. CT. R. 203(e).
159. S.C. APP. CT. R. 203(b)(1).
160. S.C. APP. CT. R. 203(c).
161. S.C. APP. CT. R. 203(d).

162. S.C. APP. CT. R. 206(a); see S.C. App. Cr. R. & 227(b).
163. The rules require the petitioner to serve a petition for writ of certiorari and the appendix
on opposing counsel and file six copies of the petition and two copies of the appendix with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court. S.C. APP. CT. R. 227(c). Rule 227(d) adds the following
requirements:
The petition for writ of certiorari shall contain the following:
(1) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and circumstances of
the case but without unnecessary detail. (2) A concise statement of the case,
containing the facts material to the consideration of the questions presented. (3) A
direct and concise argument in support of the petition. The argument relevant to each
question shall not exceed four (4) pages and shall include citation of authority and
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serve a return..

Petitioner may file a reply to the return if such a pleading

is necessary.
Aside from these technical requirements, counsel should understand
several aspects of the post-conviction appeals process. First, it is a certiorari
procedure, and, therefore, the South Carolina Supreme Court has discretionary
review."
Full briefing and plenary consideration are not given unless the
Furthermore, the court can-and frequently
court grants certiorari.
does-grant certiorari to consider some, but not all, of the issues the petitioner
raises. Nevertheless, it is critical that counsel raise every issue in the petition
for writ of certiorari. The failure to raise an issue may subsequently deprive
the applicant of federal review of the issue. In Whitley v. Bair 67 the Fourth
Circuit found that petitioner's failure to appeal certain issues to the Virginia
Supreme Court following the denial of state habeas corpus was a procedural
default barring federal habeas corpus relief. 68 While it is not clear if the
Whitley rule applies to South Carolina cases, the safest course is to include all
issues in the petition. 169 Finally, it is important that counsel realize that the
South Carolina Supreme Court utilizes a stringent standard of review in postconviction appeals. The court will affirm the lower court's decision if there
is any evidence of probative value supporting its decision. 7'

specific reference to pertinent portions of the lower court record.
S.C. App. CT. R. 227(d). The appendix, filed along with the writ of certiorari, contains: "(1)
The entire lower court record [and] (2) A copy of the final order entered after the post-conviction
proceeding. S.C. APP. CT. R. 227(e).
164. The original petition plus six copies of the return, with proof of service, must be filed
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. S.C. APP. CT. R. 227(f). The contents of the return are
set forth in the same rule.
165. Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991) (per curiam); Knight v. State, 284
S.C. 138, 325 S.E.2d 535 (1985) (per curiam); White v. State, 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35
(1974); see S.C. APP. CT. R. 227(a).
166. Certiorari will be granted "[u]pon the concurrence of any two justices...." S.C. APP.
CT. R. 227 (h). Further, the procedure to be followed once certiorari is granted is set forth in
Rule 227(h). One important difference between cases in which the court grants certiorari and
many other appeals is that oral argument is not permitted unless ordered by the supreme court.
Id.
167. 802 F.2d 1487 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987).
168. Id. at 1499-1501.
169. In this regard, the South Carolina Supreme Court determined that the procedure set forth
in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (requiring appellate counsel to brief arguable
issues, despite counsel's belief that the issues is frivolous), applies in the context of postconviction appeals. See Johnson v. State, 294 S.C. 310, 310, 364 S.E.2d 201, 202 (1988) (per
curiam). The court reasoned that even though there may not be a constitutional right to appellate
counsel in post-convictionproceedings, S.C. APP. CT. R. 227 "provides for the appointment of
counsel to seek appellate review on PCR." Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 455, 409 S.E.2d 395,
396 (1991) (per curiam).
, __,417 S.E.2d 594,596 (1992); Cobbs v. State,
170. See, e.g., Jeter v. State, _ S.C.
305 S.C. 299, 301, 408 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1991); Grier v. State, 299 S.C. 321, 323, 384 S.E.2d
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2. White v. State Appeals
Somewhat different rules apply if the applicant maintains that he was
previously denied the right to a direct appeal of his conviction. In White v.
State'7 ' the supreme court held that trial counsel is obligated to make certain
that a defendant is aware of his right to appeal his conviction, and that in the
absence of an "intelligent waiver" by the client, counsel is obligated to perfect
an appeal."
Thus, if the applicant in the post-conviction proceeding asserts
that he did not fully, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to direct
appeal, the following procedure applies:
(1) When the post-conviction relief judge has affirmatively found that the
right to a direct appeal was not knowingly and intelligently waived, the
petition shall contain a question raising this issue along with all other postconviction relief issues petitioner seeks to have reviewed. At the same
time the petition is served, petitioner shall serve and file a brief addressing
the direct appeal issues. This brief shall, to the extent possible, comply
with the requirements of Rule 207(b). Respondent's return to the petition
shall address the post-conviction issues, including whether the direct appeal
was knowingly and intelligently waived. "At the same time the return is
due, respondent shall also serve and file a brief addressing the direct
appeal issues. Within ten (10) days after service of respondent's brief,
petitioner may file a reply brief on the direct appeal issues.
(2) When the post-conviction relief judge has found that the applicant is
not entitled to a White v. State review,, the petition shall raise the question
of waiver of the right to a direct appeal along with all other post-conviction relief issues petitioner seeks to have reviewed. The petition shall also
contain a "Statement of Issues on Appeal" listing the issues to be raised if
a White v. State review is granted; this statement of issues shall comply
with the requirements of Rule 207(b)(1)(B). Briefing of the direct appeal
7
issues will not be allowed unless certiorari is granted on the issue.1 1

722, 724 (1989) (per curiam); Pringle v. State, 287 S.C. 409, 411, 339 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1986)
(per curiam).
171. 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974).
172. Id. at 118, 208 S.E.2d at 39.
173. S.C. APP. CT. R. 227(g). The procedure contained in rule 227(g) was initially set forth
in Davis v. State, 288 S.C. 290, 342 S.E.2d 60 (1986). See also King v. State, _ S.C. _,
417 S.E.2d 868 (1992) (discussing the PCR procedure); Whitehead v. State, 308 S.C. 119, 417
S.E.2d 529 (1992) (reviewing the Davis requirements); Bozeman v. State, 307 S.C. 172, 414
S.E.2d 144 (1992) (applying Davis review); Frasier v. State, 306 S.C. 158, 410 S.E.2d 572
(1991) (applying Davis review).
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G. Successive Applications
The South Carolina Supreme Court has consistently disfavored inmates
who bring more than one post-conviction challenge. In the court's view, the
UPCA, relevant rules, and the court's decisions are intended to provide an
inmate "one biteat the apple."174 The court has stated that this limitation
on an inmate's ability to challenge his conviction (or sentence) is necessary
because
[flinality must be realized at some point in order to achieve a
semblance of effectiveness in dispensing justice. At some juncture judicial
review must stop, with only the rarest of exceptions, when the system has
simply failed a defendant and where to continue the defendant's imprisonment would amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. 5
Thus, as a general rule, a second, or successive, application may not
contain issues (1) that were presented in the original application, (2) that were
fully adjudicated in the first appeal or were knowingly and voluntarily waived,
or (3) that were not raised at all, unless the applicant can provide a "sufficient
reason" why the issue(s) was not previously raised.1 76 The court also
recently stated that it interprets "sufficient reason" very narrowly, requiring
a showing that the issue "could not have been raised. " " Apparently, this
means that "as long as it was possible to raise the argument" in the first
application, the claim may not be raised in a second quest for post-conviction
78
relief.
On the other hand, the interests of justice may require a court to entertain
a second application in light of the "unique facts" presented in a particular
defendant's case. 179 Furthermore, as with any broad rule, several exceptions
clearly exist. The first clear exception involves cases in which trial counsel
also represents the applicant in the first post-conviction proceeding. In Carter
v. State"8 0 the applicant maintained in a second application for post-conviction relief that he had been denied the effective assistance of trial counsel and
that this issue previously "could not have been raised" because his trial

174. Gamble v. State, 298 S.C. 176, 178, 379 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1989).
175. Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 448, 451, 409 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1991).
176. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-90 (Law. Co-op. 1985). However, if the court voluntarily
dismissed the first application without a specific finding of prejudice, a second application will
not be deemed successive because the applicant, under those circumstances, has never had his
'one bite at the apple." See Gamble v. State, 298 S.C. 176, 178, 379 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1989).
177. Aice, 305 S.C. at 450, 409 S.E.2d at 394.
178. Id.
179. E.g., Case v. State, 277 S.C. 474, 289 S.E.2d 413 (1982) (per curiam).
180. 293 S.C. 528, 362 S.E.2d 20 (1987).
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counsel was also his counsel for his first PCR application."' Because of the
continued representation, and because Mr. Carter had not been apprised of the
consequences of proceeding with trial counsel, the court reviewed the merits
of his claims and granted post-conviction relief.'82 The court also established the following procedure:
[H]ereafter, when applicants appearing at hearings on post-conviction
relief are represented by their trial counsel, the court shall examine the
applicant concerning the waiver of the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
The court shall advise the applicant that the dual representation will
result in the waiver of any 'claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
applicant shall then state 18on
the record whether he wishes to proceed,
3
thereby waiving the issue.
Another exception to the successive application rule exists if the applicant
was denied the right created by the UPCA to appeal the denial of postconviction relief.'s In Austin v. State"u the court held that if the applicant
requested and was denied an opportunity to seek appellate review, or was not
apprised of and thus did not knowingly waive the right to appeal, then he
would be entitled to appropriate relief.8 6 Apparently, this relief would
consist of a new appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
Furthermore, an applicant may also be able to demonstrate that the issue
could not have been raised due to circumstances beyond the applicant's
control, or as the United States Supreme Court stated in dealing with similar
situations involving second federal habeas petitions, because of an objective
factor external to the defense. 18 For example, such an objective factor
could be that government interference or the reasonable unavailability of the
8
factual basis of the claim impeded counsel's ability to raise the claim.
Finally, a defendant may be able to demonstrate that the court's refusal to hear
the claim would constitute a "gross miscarriage of justice." 8 9

181. Id. at 529, 362 S.E.2d at 21.
182. Id. at 530, 362 S,E.2d at 21 ("[Albsent a showing that the applicant was specifically
advised of the hazards of being represented by trial counsel at the post-conviction hearing and
that the applicant consented to such an arrangement, a successive post-conviction application,
alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, should not be barred.").
183. Id. at 530, 362 S.E.2d at 22.
184. See Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 454, 409 S.E.2d at 396.
187. McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1472 (1991).
188. See McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
189. Aice, 305 S.C. at 451, 409 S.E.2d at 394.
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IV. STATE HABEAS CORPUS

A. Introduction
Habeas corpus, as defined by the common law, is protected by the South
Carolina Constitution, which declares in Article I, § 18 that "[tihe privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in case of
insurrection, rebellion, or invasion, the public safety may require it. " "
Without this constitutional protection, habeas would probably not have
survived the enactment of the UPCA, which purports to take "the place of all
other common law, statutory or other remedies heretofore available for
challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. " 191 With the
constitutional protection, the writ and the common law giving it substance take
on the status of state constitutional law.
Although the UPCA now clearly exceeds habeas in importance in South
Carolina," 9 the writ continues to be used. 93 The procedural rules governing its use are set forth in Rule 65 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and by statute
at Section 17-17-10 through Section 17-17-200 of the South Carolina Code.
However, neither the rules nor the statute defines the substance of habeas
corpus. To discover the nature of the grounds for which the writ will issue,
one must look to the interpretive case law.
B. Modem State Habeas Corpus
The history of habeas corpus in South Carolina was set forth in some
detail in section II of this article. 4 After the 1969 enactment of the UPCA,
state courts continued to adjudicate habeas cases in significant numbers, as the
bar adjusted to the new remedy, and as the petitions filed prior to 1969
worked their way through the system. At first, the court treated these cases
as if the UPCA did not exist and continued to develop the old remedy. 95

190. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 18. In Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, 183 S.E. 13 (1936), the
unlikely question of what constituted an insurrection was litigated after the Governor declared a
state of insurrection to force the State Highway Commissioners out of office.
191. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
192. WILKEs, supra note 32 at 914, 917.
193. Among the more important post-UPCA habeas cases are: Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466,
397 S.E.2d 87, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 972 (1990); Yates v. Aiken, 301 S.C. 214, 391 S.E.2d
530 (1989), rev'd, 500 U.S. 391 (1991); Crowe v. Leeke, 273 S.C. 763,259 S.B.2d 614 (1979).
194. See supra notes 8-72 and accompanying text.
195. See Watson v. Leeke, _ S.C. _,
194 S.E.2d 128 (1973) (per curiam) (petitioner
unsuccessfully alleged involuntary guilty plea); Richards v. Crump, 260 S.C. 133, 194 S.E.2d
575 (1973) (legality of sentence under jurisdictional theory of habeas); Calloway v. Leeke, 256
S.C. 167, 181 S.E.2d 481 (1971) (denial of preliminary hearing underjurisdictional theory, right
to counsel constitutional claim), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972).
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The most important of these cases was Williams v. Leeke, 196 in which the
court held cognizable in habeas three new constitutional claims concerning: (1)
evidence which is the product of an illegal search; (2) evidence which is the
product of an illegal arrest; and (3) the right to confrontation of adverse

witnesses. 197
Eventually the court stopped developing its habeas jurisprudence and
began treating habeas claims as if they were misnamed UPCA claims. 19
Soon after this shift, habeas petitions largely vanished. In fact, the words
"habeas corpus" appear in only three reported cases for 1975,199 and only
in one case in 1976.? In large part, the explanation for this decline may
have been perpetuated by the court's remark in Finklea v. State," 1 that the

UPCA is designed to incorporate all rights available in federal habeas
corpus. 20
However, in the last few years, habeas has undergone a minor but limited
renaissance. The most significant recent decision outlining the scope of habeas
is Butler v. State.? 3 In Butler, a capital case, the petitioner filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus in the original jurisdiction of the South Carolina
Supreme Court after exhausting his available state post-conviction and federal
habeas corpus remedies.'
In his state habeas petition, Butler raised several
claims that had not previously been presented to any court. The South
Carolina Supreme Court granted the writ and ordered a new trial, holding that
several of its prior decisions finding a violation of the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination should be applied retroactively in Mr. Butler's
case.2 5 The court opined that the "'the great and central office of the writ

196. 257 S.C. 104, 184 S.E.2d 441 (1971).
197. See id. at 109-11, 184 S.E.2d at 443.
198. See Creel v. State, 262 S.C. 558,206 S.E.2d 825 (1974); Peyton v. Strickland, 262 S.C.
210, 203 S.E.2d 388 (1974).
199. See Russellv. Cooper, 263 S.C. 526, 211 S.E.2d 655 (1975), cert. denied,423 U.S. 848
(1975); Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 417, 215 S.E.2d 883 (1975); State ex rel. McLeod v. Court
of Probate, 266 S.C. 279, 223 S.E.2d 166 (1975) (per curiam).
200. State v. Lawrence, 266 S.C. 423, 223 S.E.2d 856 (1976) (per curiam).
201. 273 S.C. 157, 255 S.E.2d 447 (1979).
202. Id. at 158, 255 S.E.2d at 447-48. However, habeas did remain available to prisoners as
a means of challenging conditions of confinement. See Crowe v. Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 259
S.E.2d 614 (1979). Furthermore, in Stichert v. Heath, 286 S.C. 456, 334 S.E.2d 282 (1985)
(per curiam), the petitioner used a habeas challenge in an attempt to resist extradition to Texas.
203. 302 S.C. 466, 397 S.E.2d 87 (1990).
204. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
205. See State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 332, 353 S.E.2d 441 (1986) (per curian), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991); State v. Pierce, 289
S.C. 430, 346 S.E.2d 707 (1986), overruledon othergrounds by Torrence; State v. Gunter, 286
S.C. 556, 335 S.E.2d 542 (1985). In Cooper, Pierce, and Gunter, the same trial judge who
presided over Butler's trial made comments that, in the court's view, "violated the defendant's
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of habeas corpus is to test the legality of a prisoner's current detention.'"=6
While noting that Butler sought to invoke legal principles recognized after his
trial, appeal, and state post-conviction remedies were complete, the court
emphasized "that not every intervening decision, nor every constitutional error
will justify issuance of the writ."'
Rather, the writ will issue only under

circumstances

where there has been a "'violation, which, in the setting,

constitutes a denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of
justice.'"" Since Butler, the Court has made clear that it envisions habeas
corpus to be a means of correcting a fundamental miscarriage of justice after
a prisoner has exhausted all other available remedies. 9
V. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON AFrER-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

This particular remedy encompasses claims based on the presentation of
evidence that was not known to exist at the time of trial, if the newly
discovered evidence reflects upon the defendant's innocence or the defendant's
moral culpability in capital cases. Although somewhat frowned upon by the
South Carolina Supreme Court,210 a motion for a new trial based on afterdiscovered evidence remains a viable remedy in this state.

A. What is After-Discovered Evidence?
The term "after-discovered evidence" refers to evidence which existed2 11
at
the time of trial, but of which the defendant was "excusably ignorant."
In State v. Haulcomb,1 the court held that evidence supporting the defendant's theory that he had been entrapped was "after-created evidence," not

[F]ifth [A]mendment rights by coercing him to take the witness stand in his defense." Butler, 302
S.C. at 467, 397 S.E.2d at 87.
206. Butler, 302 S.C. at 468, 397 S.E.2d at 88 (quoting Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335,
336 (1968) (per curiam)).
207. Id.
208. Id. (quoting State v. Miller, 84 A.2d 459, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 934 (1952) (emphasis provided in Butler)).
209. State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 69, 406 S.E.2d 315, 328 (1991) (Toal, J., concurring)
("[A]n imprisoned individual may obtaina writ of habeas corpusfrom this Court after exhausting
all other sources of relief," if he can satisfy the Butler standard.); see also Drayton v. Evatt, _
S.C. _, 430 S.E.2d 517, 520 n.2 ("This is not to say that a defendant who has exhausted his
opportunities for review on direct appeal and post-conviction relief is completely without a
rem=dy" because he can still seek a writ of habeas corpus under some circumstances.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 607 (1993).
210. See State v. Augustine, 131 S.C. 21, 126 S.E. 759 (1925).
211. State v. Haulcomb, 260 S.C. 260, 270, 195 S.E.2d 601, 606, appealdismissed, 414 U.S.
886 (1973) (citing United States v. Bensen, 142 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1944)).
212. 260 S.C. 260, 195 S.E.2d 601 (1973).
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after-discovered evidence. The distinguishing factor was that the evidence on
which the defendant relied-evidence that other individuals had been induced
to commit a similar crime by the same officer who had allegedly entrapped the
applicant-had not yet occurred at the time of Mr. Haulcomb's trial.213
Thus, while after-discovered evidence may only become manifest after trial,
it must4 have existed at that time, but nevertheless remained undiscover21
able.

B. The Elements of the Motion
In 1954 the South Carolina Supreme Court decided that for a defendant
to receive a new trial, the defendant must first make a prima facie showing
that such a new trial is warranted. 25" This is established by demonstrating
that the evidence:
216
1) would probably change the result if a new trial is had;
217
2) has been discovered since the trial;
218
3) could not have been discovered before trial;

213. See id. at 270, 195 S.E.2d at 605.
214. See id.
215. See State v. Clamp, 225 S.C. 89, 80 S.E.2d 918 (1954); see also State v. Butler, 261
S.C. 355, 200 S.E.2d 70 (1973); State v. Jennings, 40 S.C. 553, 18 S.E. 932 (1984) (both cases
maintaining the requirements of Clamp).
216. State v. Jones, 185 S.C. 274, 276, 194 S.E. 11, 12 (1937). This element of the afterdiscovered evidence test was most recently discussed in State v. South, __ S.C. _, 427 S.E.2d
666 (1993). In South, the court reversed the trial judge's decision granting Mr. South, a death
sentenced inmate, a new sentencing trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence that he had an
undiagnosed brain tumor at the time the offense was committed. On the basis of the newly
discovered evidence, the trial judge concluded that "there is a significantpossibility that the
, 427 S.E.2d at 670 (quoting the
outcome of the sentencing could have been different." Id. at
trial judge). In the court's view, this was not the legal equivalent of the "probably would change
the result" test, and it remanded the case for reevaluation under the correct standard. Id.
217. The rationale for this requirement was articulated in Jones, 89 S.C. 41, 71 S.E. 291
(1911), wherein the court concluded that "[t]o permit one on trial to hold back evidence which
he may have in his possession, or which he failed to use due diligence to obtain, and then use
it as the grounds of a motion for a new trial in the event of an adverse verdict, would be
destructive of the efficient administration of justice, and subversive of the rule that it is to the
interest of society to have an end to litigation." Id. at 49, 71 S.E. at 294.
218. Jones, 185 S.C. at 276, 194 S.E. at 12. This aspect of the test imposes a due diligence
standard on counsel. See State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86, 96, 328 S.E.2d 339, 345 (1985),
overruledon othergrounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45,406 S.E.2d 315 (1991); State v.
Kelly, 285 S.C. 373, 374, 329 S.E.2d 442, 443 (1985) ("A requisite for the grant of a new trial
leased on after-discovered evidence is that the evidence could not have been discovered with due
diligence before the first trial."). In State v. Edens, 272 S.C. 130, 250 S.E.2d 116 (1978), a
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4) is material to the issue of guilt or innocence; 219 and,

5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching.220
The petitioner must satisfy each element for the court to grant the
motion." I Furthermore, although this standard appears relatively straightforward, the contours and scope of the various elements are rather uncertain
and vary widely on a case by case basis. With one newly created exception
for capital cases discussed below,2' the court has consistently followed this
standard.
C. When Must the Motion be Filed?
The provisions of Rule 29(b) place no time limitations on a motion for
new trial based on after-discovered evidence, but do require that it be filed
within a reasonable time after discovery
of the evidence.'
The Rule also
I

forgery prosecution, the court held that counsel's failure to seek expert testimony from a
document examiner prior to trial established a lack of due diligence. Thus, the defendant's claim
that post-trial expert evidence showing the documents were not forged was held not to be afterdiscovered evidence. Id. at 134-35, 250 S.E. 2d at 118. Similarly, in State v. Allen, 276 S.C.
412, 279 S.E.2d 365 (1981), the court held that "the theory of after-discovered evidence does
not extend to evidence available or attainable from public record before the time of trial" because
"matters of public record were available to a diligent defendant." ld. at 414, 279 S.E.2d at 366;
see also State v. Fowler, 264 S.C. 149, 213 S.E.2d 447 (1975) (holding that defendant's failure
to secure testimony of person claiming to have committed defendant's crime was failure of
ordinary diligence).
219. Jones, 185 S.C. at 276, 194 S.E. at 12. Part of the materiality standard is whether the
evidence would be admissible at a retrial. In Hayden v. State, 278 S.C. 610, 299 S.E.2d 854
(1983), for example, the court concluded that because the after-discovered evidence was hearsay
from an admitted liar, thief, and drug dealer, it was unlikely to effect the outcome of a new trial.
Id.at 612, 299 S.E.2d at 856.
220. Jones, 185 S.C. at 276, 194 S.E. at 12; State v. Caskey, 273 S.C. 325, 256 S.E.2d 737
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980). In Caskey, the Court held that evidence regarding
an undisclosed deal between the state and a state's witness was "at most merely impeaching of
[the witness's] credibility and not material to appellant's guilt or innocence." Id. at 330, 256
S.E.2d at 739. See State v. Wells, 249 S.C. 249, 262-64, 153 S.E.2d 904, 911-12 (1967).
Similarly, in State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985), overruled by State v.
Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991), the court determined that evidence regarding the
victim's history of prostitution was cumulative to that presented by other witnesses. Id. at 96,328
S.E.2d at 345.
221. See Hayden, 278 S.C. at 611, 299 S.E.2d at 855.
222. See infra text accompanying notes 223-27.
223. S.C. R. CRIM. P. 29(b) provides:

A motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence must be made within a
reasonable period of time after the discovery of the evidence; provided, however, that
a motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence may not be made while
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/3
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gives the circuit judge jurisdiction to entertain this motion despite the end of
term of court if the case is not presently before the appellate
the particular
2 24
court.

D. Miscellaneous ProceduralRequirements
First, the motion must be supported by affidavits and, if available, other
relevant evidence. The moving party must also submit a personal affidavit
supporting the motion, declaring "that he did not know of the existence of
such evidence at the time of the trial and that he used due diligence to discover
such evidence, or that he could not have discovered it by the exercise of due
Second, the burden of proof as to each element of the five
diligence. "'
part test is on the moving party.'- Third, whether to grant the motion is
placed within the discretion of the trial judge, who has the obligation to
resolve any conflicts in the evidence. 7 And, as a corollary matter, the trial
court's decision will not be reversed on appeal unless the defendant can
demonstrate that the trial judge abused its discretion.'
E. The Applicability of After-Discovered Evidence in Capital Cases
Historically, the motion has been used in instances where a new trial was
sought because the after-discovered evidence was relevant to the defendant's
guilt or innocence. In State v. South, 9 however, the South Carolina
Supreme Court, for the first time, was asked to consider whether the same five
element standard" applied when the after-discovered evidence was relevant
South
to whether the defendant should have been sentenced to death."

the case is on appeal unless the appellate court, upon motion, has suspended the
appeal and granted leave to make the motion. Leave of the appellate court is not
required if no appeal has been taken or if the appeal has been finally decided in the
appellate court.
224. Id.

225. State v. DeAngelis, 256 S.C. 364, 371, 182 S.E.2d 732, 735 (1971).
226. See Hayden v. State, 278 S.C. 610, 299 S.E.2d 854 (1983).
227. State v. Edens, 272 S.C. 130, 250 S.E.2d 116 (1978); see State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23,
207 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
,427 S.E.2d
,
228. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23,207 S.E.2d 414; see State v. South, _ S.C.
666, 668 (1993) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on asserted afterdiscovered evidence which was immaterial to the appellant's guilt or innocence) (citing State v.
Caskey, 273 S.C. 325, 256 S.E.2d 737 (1979)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
229. __ S.C. _, 427 S.E.2d 666 (1993).
, 427 S.E.2d at 668.
230. Id. at
231. Id. at __, 427 S.E.2d at 669. South argued that the evidence was relevant to the
question of innocence because, as supported by the testimony of a psychiatrist, the effects of the
tumor, exaggeratedby his alcohol consumption, rendered him legally insane. However, the court
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maintained that evidence that he had a brain tumor at the time of the offense,
which went undiscovered due to the fact that a radiologist misread a
computerized axial tomography (CT) scan conducted prior to trial, was afterdiscovered evidence warranting a new sentencing trial. The court held that tie
same standard previously discussed applied with one modification: "the newly
discovered evidence must be material to any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances," as opposed to the defendant's guilt or innocence. 2 The
court then remanded the case so the correct standard could be applied. 3
VI. CONCLUSION

In this article, I have attempted to provide an overview of the various
post-conviction remedies available to incarcerated persons in South Carolina.
However, any remedy is only as effective as the advocate who utilizes it, and
the substance of the claims the advocate brings to the court's attention. In
turn, this requires both a post-conviction system that provides both adequate
time and resources for the factual and legal development of available grounds
for relief and a more skilled post-conviction bar. 4 In this very real sense,
the concerns giving rise to the modem remedies have gone unrealized, and,
unfortunately, post-conviction relief remains the "red-headed stepchild" of the
state's legal system.

determined that the psychiatrist's conclusionswere not in accord with South Carolinalaw because
voluntary intoxication does not relieve a defendant from criminal responsibility. Id. at _, 427
S.E.2d at 669.
232. Id. at _, 427 S.E.2d at 670. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp.
1993) sets forth the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that a judge or jury may consider
in a capital trial in South Carolina.
233. South, __ S.C. at _, 427 S.E.2d at 670.
234. Cowden, supra note 1, at 420.
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